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[N]o church property is taxed and so the infidel and the atheist and the man 
without religion are taxed to make up the deficit in the public income thus 
caused.1 
Over a century has passed since tax exemption for religious 
organizations was officially codified in the United States.2 These 
organizations have enjoyed the benefits of such exemptions, having grown, 
flourished, and garnered wealth and favor in society.3 In effect, the privilege 
of tax exemption has enabled religious organizations to become a form of 
“big business” in the American marketplace.4  
Most recently, religious organizations’ 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status has come under heightened political scrutiny with President 
Donald J. Trump’s promise to repeal the “Johnson Amendment.”5 Enacted in 
1954, the “Johnson Amendment” is a piece of legislation that bars religious 
organizations from receiving tax-exempt status (or altogether revokes their 
existing tax-exempt status), if the religious organization attempts to 
“influence legislation” or “participate in, or intervene in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of 
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”6 In his address to the 
National Prayer Breakfast on February 2, 2017, the President declared that 
the Johnson Amendment does not “allow our representatives of faith to speak 
freely and without fear of retribution.”7 A few months later, the President 
issued an executive order “Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty,” 
which effectively mandated the relaxation of enforcement of the Johnson 
Amendment with respect to those religious organizations that “speak[] or 
ha[ve] spoken about moral or political issues from a religious perspective.”8 
                                                 
1 ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE, MARK TWAIN’S NOTEBOOK 223 (1935).  
2 See Ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114 (1913). 
3 See Christine Roemhildt Moore, Religious Tax Exemption and the "Charitable Scrutiny" 
Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295 (2003). 
4 Id.  
5 President Donald J. Trump, Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(Feb. 2, 2017, 9:11 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/02/remarks-
president-trump-national-prayer-breakfast [hereinafter President Trump]. 
6 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
7 President Trump, supra note 5. 
8 President Donald J. Trump, Presidential Directive Executive Order Promoting Free Speech 
and  Religious  Liberty,  THE  WHITE  HOUSE (May  4,  2017),  https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
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The President made it clear that he issued the executive order for the purpose 
of “direct[ing] the [Internal Revenue Service] not to unfairly target churches 
and religious organizations for political speech.”9 
With the President having taken executive action to ease taxable 
consequences on religious organizations (and their ministers), at least with 
respect to religious liberty and freedom of speech, such action seemed to 
indicate that the President would only authorize those laws and taxes not 
unduly burdening the finances of religious organizations. Yet, in almost a 
complete about-face from the executive order, President Trump signed into 
law the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”),10 which quietly imposed a new tax 
on churches, as well as other nonprofits.11 This new tax required tax-exempt 
organizations to begin paying a twenty-one percent tax on the fringe benefits 
provided to their employees, such as parking and transportation benefits.12 
Not surprisingly, the discovery of such a taxation requirement outraged 
churches and nonprofits, largely a product of a Republican-led Congress, 
finding it “oxymoron[ic]” and “horrendously unfair,”13 particularly in light 
of the Republican-backed administration’s apparent allegiance to alleviating 
the tax burden on religious organizations.  
With much confusion surrounding the current administration’s 
actions—and whether these actions, in totality, were promulgated to ease the 
overall taxable burden on religious organizations—foundational questions as 
to the constitutional legitimacy of the statutory scheme on religious tax-
exemption persist. Muddying the waters even further are not only the policy 
constraints of First Amendment jurisprudence, but also the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) and the courts, both of which have become reluctant to 
engage in any inquiry as to the validity of a religious organization’s tax-
                                                 
presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-promoting-free-speech-religious-liberty/ 
[hereinafter Presidential Directive].  
9 President Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump at the Faith and Freedom 
Coalition’s Road to Majority Conference, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 8, 2017, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-faith-freedom-
coalitions-road-majority-conference/.  
10 Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13304, 131 Stat 2054 (2017). 
11 Brian Faler, Republican Tax Law Hits Churches, POLITICO (June 26, 2018, 5:05 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/26/republican-tax-law-churches-employees-
670362.  
12 Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13304, 131 Stat 2054 (2017).  
13 Julian Gregorio, The Unintended Target of Tax Reform: Churches Now Face 21% Penalty, 
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/7/tax-
reform-hits-churches-penalty-employee-benefits/.  




exempt status. Of course, there is merit in the maxim that “both religion and 
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from 
the other within its respective sphere.”14 Nevertheless, some of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“Code”) provisions applicable to tax-exempt religious 
organizations are constitutionally suspect, given their plausible, potential 
violation of the Establishment Clause.15 
 Because special tax rules apply exclusively to churches, it is 
important to distinguish churches, a subset of religious organizations, from 
the major umbrella category of religious organizations.16 The term “church” 
is not limited strictly to those houses of worship with Christian affiliations.17 
Rather, the Code utilizes the term “church”  to represent Christian-based 
churches, temples, synagogues, mosques, or other houses of worship. 
Although the Code uses the term “church,” the IRS has failed to statutorily 
define the term.18 Nevertheless, the IRS  generated 14 criteria that it relies 
upon in determining whether an entity qualifies as a “church.”19 The 14 
criteria are: (1) a distinct legal existence; (2) a recognized creed and form of 
worship; (3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government; (4) a formal 
code of doctrine and discipline; (5) a distinct religious history; (6) a 
membership not associated with any other church or denomination; (7) an 
organization of ordained ministers; (8) ordained ministers selected after 
completing prescribed studies; (9) a literature of its own; (10) established 
places of worship; (11) regular congregations; (12) regular religious services; 
(13) Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young; and (14) schools 
for preparing of its ministers.20 
Apprehension over the constitutionality of the pertinent tax 
provisions is especially evident where religious organizations, whose 
purposes are often premised on philanthropy and provide moral guidance, are 
able to profit in substantial sums, or realize incredible gains, by capitalizing 
                                                 
14 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948). 
15 As will be seen in later sections of this Article, we utilize the three-pronged Lemon test to 
determine whether a statute has a secular legislative purpose, by exploring the statute’s 
legislative history and Congressional intent.  
16 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REV. 8-2015, 501(C)(3): TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND 




20 Found. of Human Understanding v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 88 T.C. 1341, 1358 
(1987). 
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on preferential tax treatment. According to a 2010 estimate generated by the 
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States, contributions 
to around 330,000 churches totaled more than $34 billion.21 Moreover, 
studies estimate that U.S. churches own approximately $300 to $500 billion 
in property, some of which is exempt from state property taxation.22 On a 
local scale, New York’s nonpartisan Independent Budget Office calculated 
that New York City alone lost approximately $627 million in property tax 
revenue due to the property tax exemption for churches.23 
Perhaps what most seriously raises the brow of the taxpayer, however, 
is the inordinate gain some religious entities receive by manipulating the 
statutory scheme in their favor.24 For example, in the fiscal year from 2016 
to 2017, Lakewood Church, a “megachurch” in Houston, Texas, received an 
annual amount of $79 million in charitable contributions, which directly 
fueled its operating budget of approximately $90 million; $25 million of that 
budget was utilized for television ministry.25 In addition, the Church of 
Scientology has collected annual receipts of approximately $200 million 
($125 million of which is derived from spiritual counseling, known as 
“auditing”) in addition to enjoying property values totaling $1.5 billion.26 
                                                 
21 John Montague, The Law and Financial Transparency in Churches: Reconsidering the 
Form 990 Exemption, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 203, 206 (2013) (citing Nat'l Council of the 
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Yearbook of American & Canadian Churches 386 (2012)). 
22 Please note that the fifty (50) states and the District of Columbia afford churches, as well 
as other nonprofit organizations, exemption from state property taxation. See Jeff 
Schweitzer, The Church of America, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2011, 3:49 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeff-schweitzer/robert-jeffress-romney_b_1002753.html.  
23 David Seifman, New York City’s Losing $13.5 in Property-Tax Breaks, N.Y. POST (July 
16, 2011, 4:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2011/07/16/new-york-citys-losing-13-5b-in-
property-tax-breaks/.  
24 The Code maintains a prohibition against “inure[ment] to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual” connected to a tax-exempt organization. 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) 
(West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). Charities, including religious organizations, 
may be penalized for transacting or excess benefits in which an economic benefit conferred 
upon an insider exceeds the value of consideration. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4958(c)(1)(A)-(B) (West, 
Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). Excessive economic benefit is determined by an 
evaluation of “reasonable compensation,” which is defined as the “amount that would 
ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises… under like circumstances.” 26 C.F.R. 
§ 53.4958-4(b)(ii) (West, Westlaw current through Nov. 2, 2018). 
25 See Katherine Blunt, How Does Lakewood Church Spend Its Millions? Here’s A Look at 
the Budget, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (May 31, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/ 
investigations/article/How-does-Lakewood-Church-spend-its-millions-We-12955372.php.  
26 Christopher Matthews, How Much Does Scientology Pocket from Its Tax Exempt Status?, 
FORTUNE (Apr. 8, 2015, 8:35 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/04/08/scientology-tax-exempt/.  




Even more alarming is the luxury some ministers of the gospel realize 
through exploitation of the tax-exempt statutory scheme. In 2007, U.S. 
Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) launched an investigation27 into the financial 
status of several leaders of six large churches, requesting each leader to 
voluntarily disclose information.28 Reports from local news articles and tips 
from charity-watchdog groups drove the investigation, claiming that these 
targeted ministers were participating in lavish expenditures, including the 
purchase and enjoyment of private jets, Rolls Royce cars, vacations in Hawaii 
and Fiji, multi-million dollar homes, and in one case, $23,000 marble-topped 
commodes.29 To the Iowa Senator’s dismay, these investigations yielded 
minimal responses, if any at all, from the targeted ministries.30 Meanwhile, 
other pastors such as Kenneth Copeland, a pastor of a megachurch in Texas, 
have continued to exploit the favorable taxation scheme, enjoying a $6.3 
million estate, complete with tennis courts, a large boathouse, and garages on 
either side of the 18,000-square-foot mansion.31 
 Recognizing the  advantageous taxation benefits religious 
organizations enjoy, coupled with the potential for abuse and exploitation of 
the tax-exempt statutory scheme at the hands of religious organizations and 
their leaders, this Article proposes a three-fold solution: (1) the 
harmonization of the statutory framework, in connection with other non-
religious tax-exempt organizations; (2) the requirement of application for tax-
exempt recognition and annual tax filings, supplemented with an empowered 
                                                 
27 Senator Grassley elaborated upon the purpose of the investigation, stating the following: 
“Historically, Americans have given generously to religious organizations, and those who 
do so should be assured that their donations are being used for the tax-exempt purposes of 
the organizations. Recent articles and news reports regarding the possible misuse of 
donations made to religious organizations have caused some concern for the Finance 
Committee.” See Letter to Pastor Benedictus Hinn, World Healing Center Church, Inc., 
CHUCK GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FOR IOWA (Nov. 5, 2007), available at 
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/about/upload/prg110607b.pdf. 
28 Press Release, Grassley Seeks Information from Six Media-based Ministries, CHUCK 
GRASSLEY,   U.S.   SENATOR   FOR   IOWA  (Nov.  6,  2007),   http://grassley.senate.gov/news/ 
Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=12011.  
29 Kathy  Lohr,  Senator  Probes  Megachurches’  Finances,  NATIONAL  PUBLIC  RADIO  
(Dec. 4, 2007, 7:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16860611 
[hereinafter Lohr]. 
30 See Neela Banerejee, Senator Awaiting Records of Ministries’ Finances, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
24, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/24/us/24church.html.  
31  John Burnett, Onscreen But Out of Sight, TV Preachers Avoid Tax Scrutiny, NATIONAL 
PUBLIC   RADIO   (Apr.  2,  2014,  4:03  PM),    https://www.npr.org/2014/04/02/298373994/ 
onscreen-but-out-of-sight-tv-preachers-avoid-tax-scrutiny.  
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auditing power in the IRS; and (3) IRS enforcement of the Johnson 
Amendment’s prohibition against certain forms of “political activity.” Part I 
of this Article provides a brief history of religious tax exemption, from the 
biblical era to early American colonial society and subsequent development 
of the modern statutory scheme. Part II discusses the constitutionality of tax-
exemption of religious organizations, focusing on Free Exercise Clause and 
Establishment Clause implications. Part III begins by exploring the favorable 
tax treatment religious organizations receive, and the concern for abuse of the 
statutory scheme due to lax enforcement protocol. Part III finishes by 
asserting the aforementioned three-fold proposal, and the relative ease by 
which this three-pronged approach could be actualized. 
I. A HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTION 
To more fully comprehend the statutory framework surrounding tax 
exemption for churches and religious entities in the United States tax system, 
it is first necessary to explore the historical underpinnings of religious tax 
exemptions. Yet, even while the discussion of historical backdrop is typically 
a relatively straightforward task in a number of fields, in the context of 
religious tax exemptions, there is no precise moment in which religious 
organizations achieved state-authorized tax-exempt status.32 Scholar Dean 
M. Kelley writes: 
No one can find that point in history where some great 
lawgiver declared, “Come now, and let us exempt the church 
from taxation, for behold! it is as part of the fabric of the state 
and a pillar of the throne.” There is no time before which 
churches were taxed and in which we can seek the reason for 
exemption.33 
Although the gamut of historical evidence shows that tax exemptions for 
religious entities may have existed in ancient civilizations, such as the 
Sumerians,34 this Article narrows its historical lens primarily on taxation with 
Judeo-Christian origins.  
                                                 
32 Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: Have American Churches Failed 
to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 29, 32 (2004) 
[hereinafter James]. 
33 See Dean M. Kelley, Why Churches Should Not Pay Taxes 5 (New York, Harper & Row 
1977). 
34 John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional 
Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 522 (1991-1992) [hereinafter Whitehead].  




A. From the Book of Genesis to the Decree of Constantine 
In the Judeo-Christian context, scholars largely point to the story of 
Joseph in ancient Egypt as the first instance of religious tax exemption.35 
Joseph, who was the son of Jacob, a Hebrew living in Canaan, was sold by 
ten of his brothers into slavery in Egypt, only to eventually become the 
Pharaoh’s trusted servant.36 Given this position of stature, the Pharaoh tasked 
Joseph with ensuring that the people of Egypt were adequately fed during a 
crushing seven-year famine.37 As part of this task, Joseph executed the 
following actions: he acquired all Egyptian land, with the exception of the 
land of the priests, and he implemented a law in which the Pharaoh had a 
right to claim one-fifth of all produce generated on Egyptian land, except 
produce grown on the land of the priests.38 
Many years later, and well after Moses led the Exodus of the Israelites 
out of Egypt on a journey to the “promised land” of Canaan, the Hebrews 
formed a kingdom, ruled by David and Solomon, both of whom levied 
substantial taxes on the Hebrews.39 David, the predecessor to Solomon, 
implemented the tax to finance the Hebrew nation’s war machine; in contrast, 
Solomon, enforced a tax to build the Temple.40 Yet, while the Hebrews 
suffered a major economic burden as a direct result of this taxation, the priests 
remained unscathed by these excessive taxes.41 This was only further 
legitimized by scriptural reinforcement that religious figures were to be tax 
exempt, as revealed in the Book of Ezra: “[w]e [are] also [to] inform you that 
it is not permitted to impose taxes, tributes, or tolls on any priest, Levite, 
singer, gatekeeper, temple slave or any other servant of that house of God.”42 
It was not until the dawn of the age of Jesus Christ that the 
philosophical advocacy for the separation of church and state, at least 
regarding taxation, became manifest.43 In response to a question of whether 
Jews should pay taxes to the Roman dictator Caesar, Jesus stated, “[r]ender 
                                                 
35 James, supra note 32, at 32-33. 
36 See Genesis 41:37-46. 
37 Id. at 54-56. 
38 See Genesis 47:22, 24, 26. 
39 James, supra note 32, at 32-33. 
40 See II Samuel 1:1; I Kings 11:43. 
41 See Martin A. Larson & C. Stanley Lowell, The Churches: Their Riches, Revenues, and 
Immunities, 15 (Washington, R.B. Luce 1969) [hereinafter Larson & Lowell].  
42 Ezra 7:24 (emphasis added).  
43 See Matthew 22:15-22.  
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therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things 
that are God’s.”44 Later, following the death of Christ and subsequent acts of 
his apostles, the disciple Paul reinforced Christ’s words when addressing the 
Romans: “For because of this you also pay taxes, for the authorities are 
ministers of God, attending to this very thing. Pay to all what is owed to them: 
taxes to whom taxes are owed, revenue to whom revenue is owed, respect to 
whom respect is owed, honor to whom honor is owed.”45 
While Jesus Christ seemingly advocated the position that everyone 
was to pay imperial taxes unto Caesar, the leaders of the new age of imperial 
Christendom said otherwise. Under the Edict of Toleration in 313 C.E., the 
Roman Emperor Constantine formally deemed Christianity a religion of 
equal standing in the eyes of the Roman Empire.46 Following his decree, 
Constantine converted to Christianity, and in an effort to establish 
Christianity as the new, official religion of the Roman Empire, Constantine 
granted several advantages to the Christian Church, such as a total exemption 
from all forms of taxation, among other benefits.47 Despite the fact that 
subsequent emperors scaled back such advantageous tax benefits, many of 
the tax exemptions remained embedded within Roman society.48  
Of course, the widespread rippling effect of Christianity, born from 
the Roman Empire, naturally reached England, among others sovereignties,49 
influencing its taxation policy through the Middle Ages.50  While rulers such 
as England’s King Henry II levied taxes with exemptions for religious 
                                                 
44 Id. at  21. 
45 See Romans 13:6-7 (ESV). 
46 James, supra note 32, at 35 (“[P]lacing Christianity on equal footing with cult of Isis and 
other pagans religions within the Roman Empire”).  
47 Other benefits included the following: generous fees from the public treasury; immunity 
from military service; and the provision that Catholic [Christians] alone be eligible to hold 
political office. Moreover, the Church was empowered to receive gifts and legacies; and the 
wealth of all who died intestate or without direct heirs was automatically conferred upon it. 
See Larson & Lowell, supra note 41, at 19. 
48 James, supra note 32, at 38 (citing Alfred Balk, The Free List: Property Without Taxes 21 
(1971)). 
49 See Whitehead, supra note 34, at 530 (citing W. Durant, Our Oriental Heritage 374, 812 
(1954)).    
50 James, supra note 32, at 37. 




figures,51 others “outright repealed the ecclesiastical preference.”52 King 
Henry VIII’s decision to siphon wealth from the Catholic Church in the 
sixteenth century, upon severing ties with papacy amid the Protest 
Reformation,53 coupled with Oliver Cromwell’s rigid levying of taxes on 
church property a century later,54 visibly illustrated the deviation from state-
sponsored religious tax-exemption. This was largely because the growing 
British Empire needed a great deal of financial support to fund its imperial 
expansion.55  
  This trend was to change with the advent of the American colonies. 
Although the British throne exhibited the “very real threat to a [religious 
organization’s] existence whe[re] the ability to tax is wielded by a sovereign 
bent on destruction . . . of the institution,”56 the post-Revolutionary-War 
American experiment sought to recommit the “mutual independence of 
religious and political sovereignties.”57   
B. From Early American Society to the Modern Statutory Scheme 
Despite the fact tax exemption for religious institutions has pervaded 
numerous sovereignties, British common and equity law have had the most 
readily discernible effect on tax exemptions for churches in the United States. 
Under British common law, church property located within the parameters of 
the jurisdiction of the Crown (and its colonial annexations) was exempted 
from ecclesiastical laws.58 To secure tax exemption under British common 
law, the church seeking exemption from the property taxation was required 
to fulfill three conditions.  
                                                 
51 In 1188, King Henry I levied a tax to support the Crusades. While such an ordinance taxed 
all other persons, property and sources of revenue, it entirely exempted the “books and 
apparatus of clergymen” from the ordinance. See Claude W. Stimson, Exemption of Property 
from Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411, 416 (1934).  
52 Cody S. Barnett, Bringing in the Sheaves: Combating Televangelists’ Abuse of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 105 KY. L.J. 365, 371 (2017) [hereinafter Barnett].  
53 See J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VII 241-338 (1968).  
54 See Whitehead, supra note 34, at 530. 
55 Barnett, supra note 52. 
56 Erika Lietzan, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 
975 (1999). 
57 Id. at 975 (citing Leo Pfeffer, Church, State & Freedom 16-17 (1953)).  
58 J. Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid 
Constitutional Practice?, 64  S. CAL. REV. 363, 368 (1991) [hereinafter Witte, Jr.]. 
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First, the exemption was granted only to state-established church 
property that was used for religious purposes.59 Dissenting churches were 
ineligible for the exemption.60 Second, the exemption was only from “the 
ecclesiastical taxes that were levied for the church's own maintenance and 
use.”61 The church was required to pay other taxes, such as quit-rents and 
hearth and window taxes.62 Third, the tax exemption could be eliminated “in 
times of emergency or abandoned altogether if the tax liability imposed on 
remaining properties in the community proved too onerous.”63 
However, because many settlers of the pre-Revolutionary New World 
desired freedom from religious persecution at the hands of various European 
governments (principally, England), religious tax treatment varied from 
colony to colony, often dependent upon those religious sects occupying each 
colony.64 On the lenient end of the spectrum, more tolerant colonies, such as 
Georgia and Maryland,65 allowed taxpayers a choice in determining which 
religious organizations could receive contributions from the taxpayer-
colonist.66 On the stringent end of the spectrum, some colonies, such as 
Massachusetts, mandated the supply of  tax assistance only to churches 
recognized by the particular colony.67 In addition, Virginia instituted 
governmental measures, providing support for the clergy, at the expense of 
farmers who were required to pay tithes to the clergymen.68 
Even after the Revolutionary War and subsequent ratification of the 
Constitution in 1788–followed shortly thereafter by the adoption of the First 
Amendment in 1791–religious tax exemption did not cease.69 In fact, the 
practice of religious tax exemption continued, despite the absence of the 
following: (1) a legal basis for granting such exemptions, such as the British 
                                                 
59 Id. at 370.  
60 Id. at 371.  
61 Id.   
62 Id. at 371-72.  
63 Id. at 372. 
64 See James, supra note 32, at 38-39; see also Barnett, supra note 52. 
65 These states allowed such an election from a “general tax assessment.” See James, supra 
note 32, at 38. 
66 Barnett, supra note 52. 
67 Massachusetts exempted those individuals who supported the colony-sponsored Church, 
while enforcing a tax against those who supported the non-sponsored Congregational 
Church. See James, supra note 32, at 38-39. 
68 James, supra note 32, at 39 (citing D.B. ROBERTSON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? 47 
(1968)).  
69 See Whitehead, supra note 34, at 545.  




common law’s mandatory satisfaction of qualifying conditions;70 (2) explicit 
language in the Federal Constitution; and (3) explicit language in the newly 
adopted state constitutions.71 Despite the absence of state or federal 
constitutional mandates, state governments began enacting statutes officially 
recognizing religious tax exemptions.72 On the federal level, some early tax 
statutes contained sections requiring the exemption of federal tax from 
charitable organizations, including churches.73  
After the passage of these early statutes by the federal and state 
governments, Congress explicitly provided for the tax exemption of 
charitable organizations, including religious institutions such as churches, 
through its enactment of the first federal income tax, imposed during the Civil 
War.74 Approximately 30 years after the passage of this first federal income 
tax, Congress enacted a more comprehensive tax scheme, the Tariff Act of 
1894, which again provided an explicit exemption from tax for “associations 
organized and conducted solely for . . . religious . . . purposes.”75 Despite the 
Supreme Court’s declaration that the Tariff Act of 1894 was unconstitutional 
because its imposition of federal income taxation did not apportion in 
accordance with representation (and for reasons wholly unrelated to the tax 
exemption on religious organizations),76 the terms of the tax exemptions 
recurred in the Payne Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909,77 and again in the Revenue 
Act of 1913.78 
                                                 
70 See Witte, Jr., supra note 58, at 372-74; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 682 
(1970). 
71  For example, the Seventh Congress enacted a taxing statute for the “County of 
Alexandria,” which exempted churches from taxation. Later, the Twelth Congress refunded 
“import duties,” derived from the importation of religious articles, to the churches. Lastly, 
among the early statutes, Congress, in 1815, levied a tax on “household furniture”, but 
exempted such tax for any “religious” institution.  See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 
667 (1970); see also Act of Jan. 18, 1815, ch. 23, § 14, 3 Stat. 186, 190 (1815).  
72 For example, Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt a constitutional amendment, which 
explicitly exempted churches from property taxation, while Virginia, despite its early period 
of “anticlericalism,” implemented tax exemption for church property. See James, supra note 
32, at 40 (citing D.B. ROBERTSON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? 47 (1968)). 
73 Whitehead, supra note 34, at 541-42. 
74 Id. at 541 (citing ROGOVIN, BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT INCOME TAX EXEMPTION OF 
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 10).  
75 Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894). 
76 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895). 
77 Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909). 
78 Ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). 
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Congress eventually made federal income taxation constitutional with 
the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment,79 followed by the Revenue Act of 
1913.80 Although the Revenue Act has undergone a myriad of substantive 
revisions since its enactment, language surrounding the religious tax 
exemption has survived each iteration. In the modern statutory scheme, 26 
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) provides tax exemption for groups “organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public 
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international 
amateur sports competition.”81 Even more fascinating is the fact that 
“churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of 
churches” receive automatic tax-exempt status; in other words, churches82 do 
not need to file a Form 1023 to receive tax-exempt status, 83 nor are they 
required to file annual Form 990s to report on their financial conditions.84 
However, before analyzing the mechanics of the statute regarding tax 
exemption, and the numerous privileges that accompany the statutory 
provisions, the constitutionality and related jurisprudence surrounding 
religious tax exemption will be explored in the following Part.  
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTION 
The IRS, governmental agencies, and federal and state courts have 
either refused to define or have been extremely cautious in attempting to 
define “religious” activities or the word “religion.”85 By extension, such 
governmental entities have been reticent to engage in probing inquiries over 
tax exemption for religious entities. This is, of course, attributed to the 
existence of the First Amendment, which provides, in part, that “Congress 
                                                 
79 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration.”).  
80 See Ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114,(1913). 
81 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231) (emphasis added).  
82 Nevertheless, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) indicates that the parent category of 
“religious organization” must file a Form 990 with the IRS.  
83 Organizations Not Required to File Form 1023, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/organizations-not-
required-to-file-form-1023 (last updated Apr. 2, 2018).  
84 Annual Exempt Organization Return: Who Must File, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/annual-exempt-organization-return-who-must-file 
(last updated May 11, 2018).  
85 Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations § 10.1 (11th ed. 2016) 
[hereinafter Hopkins].  




shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”86 The component clauses, the “establishment of 
religion” and “prohibiting the free exercise” are known as the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, respectively. According to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, these clauses are designed to function as a textual 
commitment to the notion of separation between church and state. In other 
words, these clauses “rest upon the premise that both religion and government 
can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other 
within its respective sphere.”87 Nevertheless, these two clauses (hereinafter 
the “Religion Clauses”) have caused the courts to “struggle[] to find a neutral 
course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute 
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to 
clash with the other.”88  
Part II proceeds as follows: Section A briefly discusses the 
applicability of the Free Exercise Clause in relation to religious tax 
exemption; Section B analyzes the avoidance of church-state entanglement, 
as tethered in the Establishment Clause; and lastly, Section C maps the 
constitutional jurisprudence of religious tax exemption, by tracking the 
evolution of judicial thought as it relates to the charitable nature and purpose 
of religious tax exemption.  
A.  Free Exercise Clause  
The Free Exercise clause is implicated when there is a conflict 
between secular laws and the religious beliefs of an individual. Not 
surprisingly, the Supreme Court has provided a more thorough expansion on 
this very tension: the “government may neither compel affirmation of a 
repugnant belief, nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups 
because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities.”89 To ensure 
that the government does no such thing, the Court requires that a state “be 
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers”90 
and “confine itself to secular objectives, and neither advance nor impede 
religious activity.”91 
                                                 
86 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
87 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948). 
88 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-669 (1970) (emphasis added).  
89 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).  
90 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
91 Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976). 
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 Historically, religious entities such as churches have argued that the 
revocation of tax exemption would violate the Free Exercise Clause.92 
Because “an unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to 
destroy,”93 churches worry that “a more onerous tax rate . . . might effectively 
choke off an adherent’s religious practices,”94 destroying free religious 
exercise. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected this position, stating that 
“not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional.”95 More specifically, the 
burden of taxation, “to the extent that imposition of a generally applicable tax 
merely decreases” the funds available for “religious activities, any such 
burden is not constitutionally significant.”96 In sum, the Supreme Court held 
that so long as a generally applicable tax does not burden the individual’s 
practice of his or her religion, the government could theoretically levy a tax 
on the church, as there is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.97 
Notwithstanding the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause is not 
implicated by taxation on a religious entity, a law may still fail to pass First-
Amendment muster due to a violation of the Establishment Clause.  
B. Establishment Clause 
 The Establishment Clause is more applicable to the law of tax 
exemption for religious entities, given that the taxation necessarily requires 
an element of the “regulation of religious organizations and institutions.”98 
The Supreme Court has declared that the Establishment Clause’s purpose, by 
design, is to avoid “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of 
the sovereign in religious activity,”99 to steer clear from the entanglement of 
church and state. In determining whether government action complies with 
the principle of neutrality, the Supreme Court established the tripartite Lemon 
test (aptly named after the Court decision). In this test, a statute adversely 
affecting religious entities is only constitutional where the following three 
                                                 
92 See e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 582 (1983); see also Texas 
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 21, 109 S. Ct. 890, 903, 103 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989) (citing 
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985)). 
93 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819). 
94 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990). 
95 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). 
96 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990)(emphasis 
added). 
97 Emp’t Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
98 Hopkins, supra note 85.  
99 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 




criteria are met: (1) it must have a “secular legislative purpose;” (2) its 
“principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion;” and (3) it must not foster an “extensive government entanglement 
with religion.”100 
In the context of taxation, there is special concern that governmental 
“inspection and evaluation” of religious organizations, such as an audit of 
church records, membership, and financial matters, “is fraught with the sort 
of entanglement that the Constitution forbids.”101 By enacting a wholesale 
tax exemption on religious entities, there is certainly some form of 
preferential treatment of religion. Strangely, the favorable treatment of 
religious entities seems, at first blush, to directly violate separation of church 
and state and the very dangers the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.102 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in elaborating upon this irony, stated that “[b]oth tax 
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered 
through the tax system [and] [a] tax exemption has much the same effect as 
a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on 
its income.”103 Nevertheless, time and time again, the Court has stated that 
the standard for determining the constitutionality of a benefit to a religious 
organization is not that of preference; but rather, that of neutrality.104 
C. Tax Exemption & Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 Giving rise to question over the constitutionality of tax exemption for 
religious organization, within the framework of the Establishment Clause, 
was the landmark case of Walz v. Tax Commission of New York. In Walz, a 
New York property owner sued the New York Tax Commission, which 
formally granted tax-exempt status for the property of religious 
organizations.105 The Court, upholding the tax, wrote that the “State has an 
affirmative policy that considers [religious entities] as beneficial and 
stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful, 
desirable, and in the public interest.”106 The Court, nevertheless, recognized 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 619-620. 
102 Barnett, supra note 52, at 374 (citing Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. 
Ct. 1436, 1450 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing Madisonian origins of the 
Establishment Clause)).  
103 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
104 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris et al., 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).  
105 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970). 
106 Id. at 673. 
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that the granting of such tax exemptions “necessarily operates to afford an 
indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, 
involvement than taxing them.”107 Because the government, in granting such 
a tax exemption, does not directly “transfer part of its revenues to churches 
but [rather] simply abstains from demanding that the church support the 
state,” the Court held that there “is no genuine nexus between tax exemption 
and establishment of religion.”108 More specifically, the tax exemption 
“creates only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state 
and far less than taxation of churches.”109 This tangential involvement, 
according to the Court, ultimately “restricts the fiscal relationship between 
church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired 
separation insulating each from the other.”110  
Interestingly, however, was the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
“social welfare” test regarding religious tax exemption. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that such a “yardstick” approach for charitable contribution “could 
conceivably give rise to confrontations that could escalate to constitutional 
dimensions.”111 If the Court were to employ a test that would require it to 
engage in a searching inquiry of the religious organization’s activities to 
determine whether they qualify as sufficient charitable contribution, the 
Court could effectively “tip the balance toward governmental control of 
churches or governmental restraint on religious practice.”112 Justice Brennan, 
in his concurring opinion, differed significantly from the majority, insisting 
on the utilization of the “social welfare” test.113 According to Justice 
Brennan, religious organizations “are exempted because they, among a range 
of other private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-being of the 
community in a variety of nonreligious ways,” and as such, these religious 
organizations “bear burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by 
general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of the community.”114 In 
addition, Justice Brennan asserted that the “government grants exemptions to 
religious organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of 
                                                 
107 Id. at 674 (emphasis added).  
108 Id. at 675. 
109 Id. at 676. 
110 Id.   
111 Id. at 674. 
112 Id. at 675. 
113 See Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
114 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). 




American society by their religious activities.”115 Despite such a deviation 
from conventional jurisprudence on the prevention of church-state 
entanglement, Justice Brennan’s “social welfare” theory foreshadowed the 
change in paradigm with how the Supreme Court would view religious tax 
exemption.116  
In Bob Jones University v. United States, thirteen years after the 
decision in Walz, the Court borrowed from Justice Brennan’s concurrence in 
Walz when the Court upheld the IRS’s revocation of a Christian-based 
university’s tax-exempt status due to its acts of discrimination on the basis of 
race.117 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, declared that 
“entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common law 
standards of charity . . . that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must 
serve a public purpose . . . .”118 In other words, the Supreme Court based its 
revocation of the religious organization’s tax-exempt status based on a public 
policy rationale, as opposed to First Amendment constitutionality.119 Indeed, 
this new rationale indicated that it was plausible for a religiously tax-exempt 
organization to lose its status as tax-exempt if the organization effectively 
failed to provide a charitable purpose in line with 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).120 
Taking it a step further, the Court commented, in footnote 20 of the decision, 
that “contemporary standards must be considered in determining whether 
given activities provide a public benefit and are entitled to charitable tax 
exemption.”121 In essence, the Court opened the door to permissible legal 
inquiry as to whether the IRS could pursue religious organizations on the 
basis of “charitable purpose” or “public policy” under 26 U.S.C. § 
501(c)(3).122  
 After entertaining a discussion on the public-policy rationale of the 
tax-exemption, the Supreme Court returned to form, wrestling again with the 
constitutionality of the benefits that religious entities receive as a result of tax 
exemption.123 In Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the 
                                                 
115 Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
116 Christine Roemhildt Moore, Religious Tax Exemption and the "Charitable Scrutiny" Test, 
15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295, 314 (2003) [hereinafter Moore].  
117 See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
118 Id. at 586 (1983) (emphasis added). 
119 Id. at 591. 
120 Id. at 588. 
121 Id. at 593 n.20. 
122 See Moore, supra note 116, at 323-324.  
123 See Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
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Supreme Court, having employed the tripartite Lemon test,124 concluded that 
a “statute primarily having a secular effect does not violate the Establishment 
Clause merely because it ‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets 
of some or all religions.’”125 Rather, tax exemptions do not advocate for, 
endorse, or support religion in general or “[any] particular religious 
practice.”126 Being of neutral design and purpose, the Supreme Court made 
fairly clear that regulations which do “not facially differentiate among 
religious sects, but appl[y] to all religious entities,” as well as secular 
organizations, pass “constitutional muster.”127 
 In summary, the holdings of Walz, Bob Jones University, and 
Hernandez provided a jurisprudential guide for how courts will analyze 
future challenges to the constitutional legitimacy of tax-exemption for 
religious organizations, especially in juxtaposition with its secular 
counterparts in 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).  
D. The Internal Revenue Code & Religious Tax Exemption 
The Code contains numerous provisions addressing the special tax 
treatment religious organizations receive by the mere fact that they have a 
self-declared religious purpose. Groups “organized and operated exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals . . . .” 
are exempted under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).128  
Section D proceeds in two parts: Subsection i identifies and analyzes 
the constitutionality of the tax provisions which provide preferential tax 
treatment for religious organizations over other charitable organizations; and 
Subsection ii outlines the potential for abuse of the tax-exemption scheme 
and how a religious organization may have its tax-exempt status revoked or 
invalidated. 
                                                 
124 Id. at 695-697. 
125 Id. at 696 (citing McGown v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
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1. The Perks of Being Religious, and Its (Sometimes) 
Questionable Nature 
There are 14 provisions of the Code granting preferential tax 
treatment that benefit churches and other religious organizations or practices, 
some of which are constitutionally suspect.129 To begin, the IRS requires 
almost all other charitable organizations to file a Form 1023 Application for 
Recognition of Exemption, under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) of the Code.130 
Churches, as well as their associations, integrated auxiliaries, and 
conventions, however, are statutorily excused from such a filing 
requirement.131 Legislative history regarding such an exemption is silent as 
to the reason for this filing exception.132 Generally, a fairly thorough and 
complex application for recognition of tax exemption must be submitted to 
the IRS, usually leading to further requests for additional documentation from 
IRS agents, and often lasting over a series of months.133 It is clear, however, 
that the purpose of this statutory carve-out is to draw a “line of separation” 
between government and religion134 in a way that “minimize[s] entanglement 
in the exemption process.”135 Moreover, the IRS requires most tax-exempt 
organizations to file Form 990 forms, which are annual information returns 
or notices.136 Churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or 
associations, are exempted from the filing of a Form 990.137 Similar to the 
background on the lack of an initial filing requirement, there is no legislative 
history that justifies this exemption either.138 Furthermore, the Code requires 
tax-exempt entities to report to the IRS when undergoing dissolution, 
liquidation, termination, or substantial contraction.139 But, again, exempt 
                                                 
129 Bruce R. Hopkins, Religious Organizations—Constitutionality of Code Provision, 30 
TAX’N EXEMPTS 17, 20, 2018 WL 3993520 [hereinafter Religious Organizations]. 
130 26 U.S.C.A. § 508(a) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231); 26 U.S.C.A. § 
6033(i) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231).  
131 26 U.S.C.A. § 508(c)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231).  
132 Religious Organizations, supra note 129 (Hopkins is referencing H. Rep't No. 91-413, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. Rep't No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)).  
133 Religious Organizations, supra note 129. 
134 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). 
135 Religious Organizations, supra note 129. 
136 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a)(1) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231).  
137 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
138 Religious Organizations, supra note 129. 
139 26 U.S.C.A. § 6043(b) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
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from this requirement are churches, their integrated auxiliaries, conventions 
and associations (and other small public charities).140 
In the statutory realm of charitable organizations, the Code 
distinguishes those organizations classified as a “public charity” from those 
classified as a “private foundation.” Possessing status as a “public charity” is 
more advantageous from a tax perspective; churches, their conventions, and 
associations, receive automatic designation as a “public charity.”141 Once 
again, the legislative history accompanying the enactment of “public charity” 
is silent, other than Congress noting “that [it] believed that certain types of 
‘institutional’ charitable entities should be regarded as public charities 
because of their nature and activities.”142 It is important to note, however, that 
other types of organizations including schools, hospitals, medical research 
organizations, and government bodies receive similar treatment under 
“public charity” status.143  
 Although the Code provisions favoring religious tax-exemption 
appear to be arbitrary, they are plausibly rooted in anti-church-state 
entanglement grounds, at least on the basis that there is no intermeddling by 
the federal government with the fiscal nature of the religious organization,  to 
keep both spheres “insulat[ed] [] from the other.”144 Nevertheless, not all 
Code exemptions for religious organizations are rooted in the principle of the 
Establishment Clause. Of the 14 Code provisions related to religious tax 
exemption, the provision that raises arguably the most serious questions of 
constitutional validity is the “parsonage rental allowance” accorded to 
ministers of the gospel.145 This rental allowance effectively permits a minister 
of the gospel to exclude from gross income the rental value of a home 
furnished as part of compensation146 and rental allowances.147 The 
                                                 
140 26 U.S.C.A. § 6043(b)(1) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
141 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
142 Religious Organizations, supra note 129, at 21; See H. Rep't No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st 
Cong. (1969); S. Rep't No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
143 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii)- (v) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
144 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). 
145 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 107(2) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231).  
146 The rental value exclusion from income can be evaluated in a much larger context, given 
that it does bear a secular relationship to that of the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine in 
26 U.S.C.A. § 119. This doctrine is not simply restricted to religious leaders; rather, it is 
available for all employees, profit and non-profit alike, who satisfy the necessary elements 
of the doctrine.  26 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
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constitutionality of the parsonage rental allowance was first considered in 
2002 by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Warren v. Commissioner,148 
in light of Pastor Rick Warren’s housing allowances of $76,000 to $80,000 
each year, an amount equal to or just shy of his church salary.149 But before 
the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to rule on its constitutionality, Congress 
intervened by enacting legislation, titled the Clergy Housing Allowance 
Clarification Act of 2002,150 which provided a statutory rule on the “fair 
rental value” of the rental allowance paid to the ministers of the gospel as part 
of their compensation.151 
Despite Congress’s intervention, the parsonage rental allowance was 
again challenged in Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Lew, where 
a Wisconsin federal district court held that the “parsonage rental allowance” 
was unconstitutional because it results in the preferential treatment for 
religious messages, a blatant violation of the Establishment Clause.152 The 
court added that the government failed to “identify any reason why a 
requirement on ministers to pay taxes on a housing allowance is more 
burdensome for them than for the many millions of others who must pay taxes 
on income used for housing expenses,”153 and additionally found that such a 
law “discriminates against those religions that do not have ministers.”154 
Despite the court finding that all three prongs of the Lemon test were violated, 
the decision was ultimately vacated on appeal when the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit stated that the plaintiffs lacked a “constitutionally 
cognizable injury.”155 Years later, in a new case, the same federal district 
court ruled that the “parsonage rental allowance” violates the Establishment 
Clause, primarily because it has no secular purpose or effect, as required by 
the first prong in Lemon.156 This time, however, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit issued a substantive decision. 
                                                 
148 282 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).  
149 Lorelei Laird, Courts Are Hearing New Challenges to Tax Exemptions for Religion, ABA 
JOURNAL (May 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/courts_are_hearing 
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150 See Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, PL 107–181, May 20, 2002, 
116 Stat 583.  
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152 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2013). 
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154 Id. at 1068 (emphasis added). 
155 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 823 (7th Cir. 2014).  
156 Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017).  
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Circuit Judge Brennan, writing for the majority, ultimately found no 
violation of the Lemon test, declaring that the parsonage rental allowance 
“falls into the play between the joints of the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause: neither commanded by the former, nor proscribed by 
the latter.”157 Taking it a step further, the Court employed the “historical 
significance test,”158 and deferred to the government, intervening parties, and 
amici curiae’s offer of “substantial evidence of a lengthy tradition of tax 
exemptions for religion, particularly for church-owned properties.”159 In 
effect, by excluding parsonages from income, and excluding cash allowances, 
Congress was merely continuing its “’historical practice[]’ of exempting 
certain church resources from taxation.”160 Although the plaintiff of the case 
was “weighing whether to ask the full 7th Circuit to review the case or take 
it to the U.S. Supreme Court,”161 no petition for certiorari was filed, leaving 
more ambiguity whether this issue will appear before the Supreme Court 
again.  
Other Code provisions that raise Establishment Clause issues include 
rules about “charitable gift substantiation” and “quid pro quo contributions.” 
Most intriguing about the rules surrounding charitable gift substantiations, in 
connection with religious organizations, is that the Supreme Court addressed 
its constitutional validity five years before the enactment of this section. The 
Supreme Court explored the “inherently reciprocal nature” of charitable 
exchanges with a religious organization.162 Evaluating the payments given to 
the Church of Scientology in exchange for auditing sessions (designed to 
augment spiritual actualization), the Court found that, in the context of a 
charitable contribution, only those “unrequited payments” may be 
deductible.163 Here, however, the Court found that the exchange of a donative 
gift contribution for goods or services (i.e., the auditing sessions) was the 
very embodiment of a quid pro exchange.164 Despite holding that such 
payments to religious organizations should not be given special preference, 
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Congress codified an exemption for compliance with gift substantiation and 
quid pro quo exchanges. Consequently, many “charitable exchanges” will 
likely fly under the statutory and constitutional radar.  
 Additional provisions appear to flag constitutional concern and 
controversy with secular purpose. Code rules, centered on commercial-type 
insurance, preclude tax exemption for tax-exempt charitable organizations 
when the organizations’ primary activity is to issue commercial-type 
insurance, or in the alternative, treat such insurance activity as an unrelated 
business.165 Of the five exceptions to the definition of “commercial-type 
insurance,” one pertains to casualty or property insurance provided by a 
church, or a convention or association of churches.166 The other pertains to 
the award of retirement and/or welfare benefits by a church, or a convention 
or association of churches, for the employees of the same, or for the 
beneficiaries of the employee.167 Thus, in applying the first prong of the 
Lemon test, it is clear there is no obvious secular rationale for  a carve-out for 
churches and associations or conventions of churches. As a result, other 
charitable organizations that provide the same benefits and insurance as 
churches and associations or conventions of churches are at risk for (1) denial 
or revocation of tax exemption, or (2) unrelated business income taxation.168  
Perhaps the most blatantly constitutionally suspect provision relates 
to the Code’s rules regarding neighborhood land. As a general statutory 
matter, a tax-exempt organization is taxed for income derived from debt-
financed property, and such income recorded as unrelated business income 
for tax purposes.169 The Code recognizes an exemption for interim income 
derived from debt-financed neighborhood real property and received by a tax-
exempt organization.170 To meet this exemption, the tax-exempt organization 
must devote the property to one or more exempt uses within ten years of 
acquiring the property, and have the property situated in the organization’s 
neighborhood.171 Churches, however, receive a five-year increase in the 
permissible time to put the property to one or more exempt uses, and are not 
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obligated to have the property situated in the church’s neighborhood.172 
Although the legislative history is silent about this special rule,173 the Code 
openly signals a violation of the second prong of Lemon by titling this special 
rule as the “Special rule for churches.”174 Armed with no secular rationale 
and facial impropriety of government advancement of religion, this carve-out 
for tax-exempt churches raises red flags about its constitutionality.  
 As discussed above, tax-exempt religious entities enjoy a wide spread 
of privileges that are unavailable to secular-based charitable organizations, 
even those which provide more tangible economic benefits to the U.S. 
infrastructure. How then should the constitutional legitimacy of statutes 
which either provide legislatively inexplicable benefits or violate the prongs 
of the Lemon test be addressed? The IRS is empowered and has authority to 
examine tax-exempt organizations; but as we will see, special rules impose 
restrictions on tax examinations concerning religious entities, such as 
churches.175 Despite this, there are other means by which the IRS could more 
effectively regulate religious organizations’ potential exploitations of the 
Code.  
2. Caution Over the Abuse of Tax Exemption 
Given the remarkable benefits and tax advantage religious 
organizations enjoy, even over fellow tax-exempt charitable organizations, 
the Code opens the possibility for religious organizations to exploit the 
modern taxation framework. At the very minimum, a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) 
group must satisfy a tax-exempt purpose and neither (1) “inure[] to the benefit 
of any private shareholder or individual” “[a] part of the [organization’s] net 
earnings,” nor (2) “attempt[] to influence legislation . . . or intervene in . . .  
any political campaign on behalf of… any candidate for public office.176 
Thus, the Code explicitly forbids tax-exempt religious organizations from 
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operating as (1) commercial enterprises for private gain,177 or (2) vehicles for 
lobbying or political activities.178  
Despite these clear prohibitions, the IRS’s ability to investigate is 
clearly hampered due to the difficulty of policing new religions (and their 
accompanying practices),179 and restrictions on church taxation inquiries and 
examinations.180 Novel churches, such as “electronic churches” and “mail-
order ministries,” frustrate the IRS because the IRS must walk a delicate 
balance between legally acceptable probing into potential tax fraud or 
sheltering and recognizing constitutional protections for nontraditional, 
minority, or unorthodox religious groups.181 Amid the “tightrope act,” abuse 
cases remain prevalent, with “tax avoidance clearly taking precedence over 
religion.”182 Recognizing the reality that “taxpayers who establish churches 
solely for tax avoidance purposes” was “reaching a breaking point,”183 the 
Tax Court declared that “taxpayers [who] use the pretext of a church to avoid 
paying their share of taxes” and who “resort to the courts in a[n] [] attempt to 
vindicate themselves” will have sanctions imposed upon them for undue 
delay,184 and will be penalized for evasion of taxes legally due.185  
Almost a year after the Tax Court’s warning to potential abusers, The 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 went into effect, including special rules 
(known as the “Church Audit Procedures Act”) that imposed restrictions on 
the IRS in its investigations of churches.186 Not surprisingly, the legislative 
history of these rules is silent on the reason for this enactment.187 On its face, 
                                                 
177 For example, a court held that contributions to a church from a restaurant were not 
deductible because the restaurant’s business activities, in connection with the church, were 
of a commercial character, rendering the status of the church taxable. See Riker v. Comm’r, 
244 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1957).  
178 For example, a court affirmed the government’s revocation of the tax-exempt status of a 
national ministry organization, upon a finding that a majority of its activities were designed 
to carry on propaganda, influence legislation, intervene in political campaigns. See Christian 
Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).  
179 Hopkins, supra note 85, at § 10.2(c). 
180 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7611(a)(1) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
181 Hopkins, supra note 85, at § 10.2(c). 
182 Id.  
183 See e.g., Miedaner v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 272, 282 (1983) (emphasis added). 
184 Id.; see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 6673 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
185 Miedaner, 81 T.C. at 282; See also 26 U.S.C.A. § 6663 (West, Westlaw current through 
P.L. 115-231). 
186 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7611 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
187 Receiving bipartisan support, sponsors of the bill, Representative Mickey Edwards and 
Senator Charles Grassley introduced the Church Audit Procedure Acts, noting that the Act 
82                                   CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW                                  Vol. 5 
 
like the other Code provisions granting advantages to religious tax 
exemptions, this restriction appears to violate the first two prongs of the 
Lemon test: (1) it does not have a secular legislative purpose, and (2) its 
primary effect is the advancement of religion.188 The statute provides that a 
church tax inquiry can only be commenced “if an appropriate high-level 
Treasury official reasonably believes . . . that the church (A) may not be 
exempt, by reason of its status as a church . . . or (B) may be carrying on an 
unrelated trade or business . . . .”189 The purpose of the Church Audit 
Procedures Act is to “assist both the church under examination and the 
Internal Revenue Service in a tax audit and resolve clearly defined issues 
quickly in consonance with [the] Constitution.”190 The Act possesses 
additional features other than the “reasonable belief” basis: restrictions on 
examinations,191 notice requirements,192 limitations on period of inquiries 
and examinations,193 and pre-examination conferences between the targeted 
churches and the IRS.194  
But just as the IRS received statutory ammunition to investigate and 
explore potential abusers of the modern statutory scheme, the IRS also failed 
to define the “high-level Treasury official,”195 effectively rendering the 
Church Audit Procedures Act hamstrung. Even as the IRS attempted to vest 
auditing power in the Director of Exempt Organizations Examinations 
(“DEOE”),196 a church successfully argued that the DEOE did not meet 
                                                 
would “resolve clearly defined issues quickly in consonance with [the] Constitution. See 130 
CONG. REC. 9,152 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984) (statement of Sen. Grassley); see also Religious 
Organizations, supra note 129, at 23, (citing H. Rep't No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
(1984) (Conference Report)).  
188 Religious Organizations, supra note 129, at 23. 
189 26 U.S.C.A. § 7611(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
190 Barnett, supra note 52, at 379 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. 9,152 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984) 
(statement of Sen. Grassley)).  
191 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7611(b) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
192 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7611(a)(3), (b)(2)-(3) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
193 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7611(c)(1) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
194 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7611(b)(3)(A)(iii) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). 
195 See J. Michael Martin, Why Congress Adopted the Church Audit Procedures Act and 
What Must Be Done Now to Restore the Law for Churches and the IRS, 29 AKRON TAX J.. 
1, 21 n.100 [hereinafter Martin]; see also John Burnett, Can A Television Network Be a 
Church? The IRS Says Yes, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 1, 2014, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/04/01/282496855/can-a-television-network-be-a-church-the-irs-
says-yes [hereinafter Television].  
196 United States v. Living Word Christian Ctr., No. 08-mc-37 (ADM/JJK) 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 106639, at *18 (D. Minn. Nov. 18, 2008). 




congressional intent in naming a “high-level Treasury official.”197 The court, 
in opining over the qualifications of the DEOE, declared that because the 
DEOE was an examining authority, the DEOE was “at odds with the 
legislative purpose of vesting the authority to halt over-zealous examination 
of churches in a high-level Treasury official.”198 Following this decision, the 
IRS retreated, abstaining from defining the appropriate official to satisfy the 
“high-level Treasury” position,199 leading to an ultimate cessation in the 
conducting of church audits.200 As a result, questions again lingered 
concerning how the IRS was to investigate prospective abusers of the taxation 
scheme.  
E. The Johnson Amendment  
The Johnson Amendment, as codified in 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3), 
provides that a tax-exempt entity must limits its charitable activities so that: 
[N]o substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation 
(except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which 
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
public office.201 
In other words, the Code imposes two obligations on tax-exempt religious 
organizations: (1) propaganda, or other undefined attempts to influence 
legislation, may not comprise a “substantial part” of the religious 
organization’s activities; and (2) churches may not participate in, or intervene 
in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition) to any candidate 
who is seeking a position in the public office.  
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 In contravention to these impositions by the Code, the President’s 
issuance of the executive order “Promoting Free Speech and Religious 
Liberty” called for the IRS to abandon enforcement of the Johnson 
Amendment against those religious organizations not playing within the 
bounds of the Code’s political prohibitions.202 This Article calls not only for 
the abandonment of the executive order, thereby permitting the IRS to resume 
enforcement of the Johnson Amendment, but also for the enforcement to be 
stringently advanced, so that tax-exempt religious organizations are obligated 
to rigidly adhere to the Code’s restrictions. But before providing suggestions 
for how the IRS could effectively crack down on those religious 
organizations that are abusing technical work-arounds, it is first useful to 
address often-invoked challenges to, and criticisms of, the Johnson 
Amendment and its prohibition on certain forms of political activity. 
Before drawing upon the sound, constitutional justifications as to why 
the Johnson Amendment passes muster, it is first necessary to clarify what 
exactly the Johnson Amendment outright prohibits, and what it has always 
permitted. Prior to the issuance of the executive order, the President, in his 
remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, declared that the repeal of the 
Johnson Amendment is critical to the “freedom [of] the right to worship 
according to our own beliefs.”203 Its removal from the Code would encourage 
and allow “our representatives of faith to speak freely and without fear of 
retribution.”204 Yet, while such a declaration is certainly laudable in its 
promotion of First Amendment protections, the President ultimately missed 
the mark. The Johnson Amendment does not punish those members, or even 
church leaders (e.g., pastors, ministers, etc.), who speak in an individual 
capacity regarding political issues that are in direct conflict with, or in support 
of, the moral obligations of their religion. Rather, the Johnson Amendment 
punishes speech offered by those individuals speaking as emissaries of the 
religious organization. More simply, it is not speech from religiously 
affiliated individuals that is punished (as this speech is highly protected under 
First Amendment protections), it is speaking from the pulpit, designed and 
intended to promote political ideas or to support candidates for public office, 
on behalf of the religious organization.  
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Former president John F. Kennedy articulated this fine distinction on 
the importance of religious liberty and freedom of speech in his historic 
address to the leaders of the Southern Baptist Church.205 In the context of 
anti-Catholic sentiment and fear that the presidential candidate would 
unquestionably follow direct orders from the Vatican, Kennedy delivered an 
impassioned speech before the Greater Houston Ministerial Association.206 
In the address, John F. Kennedy envisioned a separation of church and state, 
and disentanglement between politicians and church leaders:  
I believe in an America where the separation of church and 
state is absolute -- where no Catholic prelate would tell the 
President (should he be a Catholic) how to act and no 
Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to 
vote -- where no church or church school is granted any public 
funds or political preference -- and where no man is denied 
public office merely because his religion differs from the 
President who might appoint him or the people who might 
elect him. . . . I believe in an America that is officially neither 
Catholic, Protestant nor Jewish -- where no public official 
either requests or accepts instructions on public policy from 
the Pope, the National Council of Churches or any other 
ecclesiastical source -- where no religious body seeks to 
impose its will directly or indirectly upon the general populace 
or the public acts of its officials -- and where religious liberty 
is so indivisible that an act against one church is treated as an 
act against all.207 
Ultimately, John F. Kennedy imagined not the silence of religiously driven 
speech, but a necessary barrier between formal religious speech as it relates 
to political activity, and vice versa.  
Perhaps the foremost raised contention against the constitutionality of 
the Johnson Amendment is that it infringes on a religious organization’s (and 
its ministers’) First Amendment right to the free exercise of its religion. 
While there is a restriction on religious entities and their freedom to express 
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overtly political views or advocate for a candidate for public office, this 
provision passes constitutional muster. Under Employment Division v. Smith, 
the Supreme Court held that the right of free exercise “does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct 
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”208 Here, the Johnson 
Amendment is neutral both on its face and on its application: it governs non-
religious 501(c)(3) organizations that have tax-exempt status.209 To exclude 
religious organizations from this requirement would be the functional 
equivalent of awarding preferential treatment to religious organizations.210 
Thus, while the Johnson Amendment does not address the fact that some 
religious organizations and ministers may feel compelled by their religious 
beliefs to engage in political discussion, the Johnson Amendment is 
constitutional, given its application is neutral, secular, and generally 
applicable to all 501(c)(3) organizations. 
 Second to criticism under Free-Exercise principles are challenges 
under the First Amendment right of free speech. Time and time again, 
however, plaintiffs have challenged the Johnson Amendment but failed to 
demonstrate that the Johnson Amendment violates the First Amendment right 
of free speech. In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, the 
Supreme Court upheld the denial of 501(c)(3) status to a religious 
organization, stating that the “Congress is not required by the First 
Amendment to subsidize lobbying.”211 Elaborating upon the legal 
justification for the Code’s prohibition of certain political activity, the Tenth 
Circuit, in Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 
provided: 
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a matter 
of grace rather than right, we hold that the limitations 
contained in Section 501(c)(3) withholding exemption from 
nonprofit corporations do not deprive [the religious 
organization] of its constitutionally guaranteed right of free 
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speech. The taxpayer may engage in all such activities without 
restraint, subject, however, to withholding of the exemption 
or, in the alternative, the taxpayer may refrain from such 
activities and obtain the privilege of exemption.212 
Thus, the courts have made clear that the government has absolutely no 
obligation to provide tax exemptions for tax-exempt organizations that 
engage in forbidden political activity.213 Tax-exemption is a form of 
congressional grace,214 rather than a constitutional right: what Congress 
“giveth,” it may “taketh” away.  
 These challenges and criticisms of the Johnson Amendment overlook 
the genuine, compelling purpose of the Johnson Amendment. If Congress 
were to repeal the Johnson Amendment, 501(c)(3) organizations, including 
religious organizations, could receive tax deductions for donations to 
religious organizations.215 What is the significance of this result? Donors 
could deduct any contributions on their federal income tax return, creating 
incentives for donors to donate to tax-exempt organizations, as opposed to 
Political Action Committees (“PACs”) or super-PACs.216  
Moreover, even when PACs and super-PACs are required to identify 
their donors, donors of 501(c)(3) organizations, including religious entities, 
are not required to disclose their donors’ identities.217 In Citizens United vs. 
Federal Election Commission, Justice Kennedy expounded upon the dangers 
of donor-driven political action:  
When private interests are seen to exert outsized control over 
officeholders solely on account of the money spent on (or 
withheld from) their campaigns, the result can depart so 
thoroughly “from what is pure or correct” … that it amounts 
to a “subversion ... of the ... electoral process.”218  
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Depriving Congress of the capacity to regulate the electioneering 
process yields the “‘cynical assumption that large donors [who] call the tune 
could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic 
governance.’”219 While the First Amendment does indeed protect the sanctity 
of political speech, transparency through donor disclosure “enables the 
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different 
speakers and messages.”220 Armed with the tax deduction, the donor of the 
religious organization would be shielded from having to disclose its 
donations; consequently, the absence of donor transparency could signal the 
death toll for an effective democracy: “cynicism and disenchantment.”221 
  Assuming the absence of the Johnson Amendment, religious 
organizations, whose tax-exempt status presupposes the offering of 
community philanthropy and moral guidance, could pocket sizable 
contributions from donors, all in the name of supporting a political cause, 
ideology, or candidate for office. This absence could breed grounds for 
generating tax shelters and donor transparency, thereby welcoming the 
potential for improperly arranged religious organizations. Thus, the Johnson 
Amendment serves a more compelling interest than merely prohibiting 
entanglement between religious ideology and political activity: it “ensures 
that citizens of all faith traditions (or no faith tradition) are not inadvertently 
financially supporting church-based politicking,” and further guarantees 
“that the government [is] not entangled in underwriting partisan political 
activity”222 under the guise of religious liberty.  
III. SOLUTIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITIES AND CHURCH ABUSE  
Given the numerous privileges that tax-exempt religious 
organizations enjoy over complementary charitable organizations, it is no 
wonder why some founders of such religious organizations have exploited 
the modern statutory framework surrounding 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).223 
Eradication of such abuse, however, does not call for the complete revocation 
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of tax exemption for religious organizations. As discussed earlier, religious 
organizations provide intangible benefits that “uniquely contribute” to the 
diverse American tapestry.224 Also, as the Supreme Court has recognized, 
there is at least some constitutional justification, vis-à-vis the Establishment 
Clause, for identifying a nexus between tax exemption and the functions of 
religious organizations.225 This Article argues for a middle-of-the-road 
position, one which respects the societal purpose of tax exemption for 
religious organizations, but which also brings the requirements for religious 
organizations more in line with the obligations of non-religious charitable 
organizations. The proposal is three-fold: (1) harmonize the statutory 
framework in conformity with other tax-exempt, charitable organizations; (2) 
require initial tax filings and Form 990s, supplemented with an empowered 
“Church Audit Procedures Act”; and (3) mandate the IRS to enforce the 
Johnson Amendment’s prohibition on specified political activity 
A. Harmony Among Charitable Organizations 
Religious organizations experience clearly measurable tax 
advantages, even over other 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations.226 We are 
left to accept these advantages as rooted in acknowledgement and respect for 
the tension between the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause. But 
even where some of the statutory exemptions for religious organizations may 
be explained by First Amendment jurisprudence (i.e., exemption for initial 
filing), such a philosophy does not explain, or even rationalize, why other 
exemptions, such as the exemption for income derived from debt-financed 
neighborhood property, exist. Yet, similarly situated charitable organizations 
experience no such exemptions.227 As demonstrated in Section II, these tax-
exemption provisions are likely unconstitutional as applied strictly with 
respect to religious organizations, due to the violation of the tripartite Lemon 
test.  
This Article argues that statutory provisions exempting religious 
organizations from standard charitable obligations (or giving them more 
statutory grace) should be re-written to align with the exemptions available 
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to all charitable organizations. To start, such a solution is clearly 
constitutional,228 because there is an obvious secular legislative purpose for 
requiring equal treatment between secular charitable organizations and 
religious organizations. Moreover, equal treatment among organizations 
clearly does not promote or inhibit the exercise of religion; rather, equal 
treatment permits the religious organizations to operate on grounds of 
taxation and financing, rooted in neutrality. With no special statutory 
treatment to religious organizations, no further inquiry is required as to 
whether there is a Lemon violation, harmonizing the taxation regime for 
religious organizations with the rest of the regime on charitable 
organizations. Second, the court system has already demonstrated that a 
number of these provisions, such as the parsonage rental allowance, are 
constitutionally or entirely suspect.229 What is to stop prospective litigants 
from challenging the constitutional validity of these tax advantages; 
consequently, what is to stop the courts from striking down the remaining 
provisions as unconstitutional Lemon violations? The answer is nothing. All 
that remains is proper standing to challenge these provisions.  
Therefore, to remove any suspicion as to government-sponsored 
advancement of religion, the IRS should align the following provisions of the 
Code with other charitable organizations: initial tax recognition and 
assessment;230 annual information returns and notices;231 report of 
dissolution, liquidation, or substantial contracting;232 parsonage rental 
allowance;233 charitable gift substantiation rules;234 quid pro quo contribution 
requirements;235 commercial insurance exception;236 commercial insurance 
benefits exception;237 the debt-financed neighborhood land rule;238 and 
limitations to IRS on examination of religious organizations.239 Of course, 
this is merely the first step in the progression toward statutory harmony. The 
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following subsection addresses arguably the most important component of 
the harmonization: the demand for initial filing for exempt status and 
subsequent annual filings, coupled with effective utilization of the Church 
Audit Procedures Act. 
B. Tax-Exemption Filings & IRS Examinations 
Recalling the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in the Walz 
decision: religious organizations “are exempted because they, among a range 
of other private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-being of the 
community in a variety of nonreligious ways,” and as such, these religious 
organizations “bear burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by 
general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of the community.”240 
And again, in Bob Jones University the Court, echoing the concurrence of 
Brennan, declared that “entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting 
certain common law standards of charity . . . that an institution seeking tax-
exempt status must serve a public purpose . . . .”241 
To ensure that religious organizations meet these “common-law 
standards of charity” and avoid behavior that does not serve a public purpose, 
a more thorough review by the IRS is imperative. First, Congress should 
revise the Code to require religious organizations to file a Form 1023, which 
excuses churches, integrated auxiliaries of churches, and conventions and 
associations.242 Second, Congress should additionally revise the Code to 
require religious organizations to file annual information returns (i.e., Form 
990) or submit notices to the IRS. At first glance, it appears the imposition of 
filings upon religious organizations would violate Establishment Clause 
principles, because the IRS would necessarily intermeddle with the nature of 
religious organizations. While there is some validity to this claim, the purpose 
of the initial filing with the IRS is to “give[] notice to the Secretary” of its 
application for recognition as a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).243 It is not to review 
the practices and belief systems of the religious organization seeking an 
exemption.  
The requirement for filing a Form 990 is no different in its non-
invasive nature. The Form 990 sets forth the following items pertinent to the 
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financial actions of the organization: gross income, receipts, disbursements, 
gifts and contributions received from various sources, and “other information 
for the purpose of carrying out the internal revenue laws.”244 Thus, the 
statutory scheme surrounding the Form 990 never requires an annual review 
of the religious organization’s practices. Instead, it only requires a review of 
its financial operations. To support this position, the Supreme Court has noted 
that “routine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into religious 
doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no ‘detailed 
monitoring and close administrative contact’ between secular and religious 
bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command.”245 In fact, 
some scholars argue the current exemption of the Form 990 requirement 
entangles the government more with religion.246 The Code excuses the Form 
990 requirement for a major subset of religious organizations: churches, an 
interchurch organization of local units of a church, a convention or 
association, an integrated auxiliary of a church, and some church-affiliated 
organizations and mission societies.247 As a result, the IRS is often required 
to employ a fourteen-point test to determine what constitutes a church, which 
then demands a thorough inquiry of a church’s religious beliefs.248 With the 
employment of the fourteen-point test to determine whether the organization 
qualifies as a church, both courts and religious organizations have 
demonstrated discomfort with the likelihood that the courts will render 
inconsistent determination.249  
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Of course, the obligation of initial filings and Form 990s amounts to 
nothing, unless the IRS is statutorily authorized to conduct an investigation 
under the Church Audit Procedures Act (“CAPA”). Recall that the CAPA 
authorizes a “high-level Treasury official” to initiate an audit or investigation 
against an organization classified as a church by the IRS.250 Before 
conducting such an audit, the “high-level Treasury official” must have a 
“reasonable belief” that the church is either (1) not actually a church as 
defined in the IRS regulations, or (2) engages in otherwise taxable activity.251 
But while the Act does appear to empower the IRS to conduct a more 
comprehensive inquiry, the “high-level Treasury official” remains undefined, 
with Congress and the IRS abstaining from taking actions to designate an 
individual or associated IRS position to fulfill the role.252 The solution, 
though demanding considerable Congressional action, is straightforward: 
Congress and/or the IRS must select an appropriate “high-level Treasury 
official.” While the statute does contemplate the selection of a secretary of 
the Treasury,253 it is fair to state that audits of churches (and other church-
related organizations) are a fairly low priority. Some scholars argue the 
Director of Exempt Organizations (“DEO”), an official merely one rank 
above the DEOE, should be selected. Like the DEOE, this too received 
disapproval.254 Alternatively, other scholars have taken the approach most 
closely resembling Occam’s razor, “[a]mend[ing] the [Act] [to] [n]ame the 
[IRS] Commissioner [or his designee] as a sufficient ‘High-Level Treasury 
Official.’”255 This position has been endorsed by multiple organizations, 
including the American Center for Law and Justice.256 
In sum, the IRS, empowered with the capacity to demand Form 1023s 
and subsequent filings of Form 990s, could easily review and audit the 
financial workings of religious organizations—specifically churches—to 
ensure that they are serving a proper public purpose. Moreover, the IRS, as 
advocated by scholars, should name an appropriate individual to the position 
of “high-level Treasury official” to give teeth to the Church Audit Procedures 
Act. These demands, which facially appear to require more state 
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involvement, would merely require the IRS and federal government to 
perform a review of the financial data of the organizations to ensure that no 
abuse or non-charitable activity is alive within the religious organization. 
C. Strict Enforcement of the Johnson Amendment 
For all the fierce opposition to the Johnson Amendment, the irony is 
the law has never been stringently enforced against those churches violating 
the prohibitions of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). In fact, there exists only one court 
decision in which a church lost its tax-exempt status as a result of violating 
the statutory ban on specified political activity.257 Remarkably, there is 
evidence suggesting that religious organizations violate these prohibitions 
more egregiously than the IRS’s history of enforcement may suggest. In 
2004, the IRS commenced a project titled the “Political Activity Compliance 
Initiative” (the “Initiative”), the purpose of which was to “promote 
compliance” with the 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) prohibition “against political 
campaign intervention by reviewing and addressing allegation of political 
intervention (PI) by tax exempt organizations on an expedited basis during 
the 2004 election year.”258 Of the 132 cases assigned to the IRS for further 
examination, 40 involved churches.259 Further, of the 40 churches targeted, 
37 churches were found to have improperly committed acts of political 
convention, to which the IRS issued written advisories or assessed excise 
taxes.260 Thus, given the statistical figures of this study, and the vast number 
of churches in the United States, a large number of churches likely engage in 
some form of politics that may cross the threshold of improper politicking.261  
But the IRS is lax—at best—in its enforcement of the Johnson 
Amendment. Of course, there are consequences to such unpredictability and 
restraint. For one, lax enforcement by the IRS encourages, or even enables, 
churches, associations, conventions,  and integrated auxiliaries of the 
churches to feel more empowered to violate the Johnson Amendment, due to 
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the low number of IRS investigations of churches.262 In addition, the IRS’s 
minimal enforcement of the political ban provides little guidance to those 
religious organizations seeking to discern what compliance and non-
compliance may actually amount to, through a prosecutorial lens.  
Even more agonizing is the fact that the IRS has yet to issue clear 
guidance as to exactly what constitutes forbidden political activity. Turning 
directly to the statute, one can readily see that 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) fails to 
define: (1) what amounts to a “substantial part” of a religious organization in 
attempting to influence legislation, and (2) what constitutes “participati[on]” 
or “interven[tion]”in a political campaign, on behalf of (or in opposition to) 
any candidate for public office.263 Not surprisingly, the companion 
regulations to the Code are equally worthless, stating the obvious extent of 
the statute: “the publication or distribution of written or printed statements or 
the making of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a 
candidate” are forbidden.264 
In yet another attempt to clarify the reach of the Johnson 
Amendment’s prohibition on specified political activity, the IRS published 
Revenue Ruling 2007-41, which provides 21 examples illustrating the 
application of the facts and circumstances to be considered to determine 
whether an organization exempt from income tax under section 501(c)(3) has 
engaged in any forbidden political activity.265 But just as one expects the IRS 
to provide clear lines of demarcation with this newly promulgated Revenue 
Ruling, it warns the reader that an organization’s activities must be measured 
by “all the facts and circumstances” present in the factual situation.266 Equally 
less helpful is the fact that each of the factual situations listed “involves only 
one type of activity,” with further analysis needed when there is a 
“combin[ation] [of] one or more types of activity.”267 But more disheartening 
than the frailty of ideally constructed factual situations is that the Revenue 
Ruling does not teach the practitioner any more than previously known.  In 
fact, the IRS fully acknowledged that religious organizations may engage in 
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political activity, so long as this activity is performed in a neutral fashion, as 
embodied in the following actions:  
[1] Invite all candidates for political office to address their 
congregation, provided there is a statement that says the views 
expressed are those of the candidates and that the church is not 
endorsing any candidate. . . . [2] Distribute a list of voting 
records of all members of Congress on major legislative issues 
involving a wide range of subjects, provided the publication 
contains no editorial opinion and its content and structure do 
not imply approval or disapproval of any members or their 
voting records. . . . [3] Sponsor a voter registration drive, 
provided it is done so in a neutral manner and is non-
partisan.268 
Although intended to act as more helpful guidance to religious organizations, 
the Revenue Ruling ultimately falls short of its aim, teaching no more than is 
already known, and failing to give meaningful enforceability of the Johnson 
Amendment.  
 As such, enforceability of the political prohibitions requires more than 
mere advisory opinions; enforceability demands congressional resolution of 
ambiguity and actual enforcement by the IRS against those religious 
organizations in direct violation of the statute. Professor Vaughn E. James 
proposes a twofold approach to more efficient enforcement of 26 U.S.C. § 
501(c)(3): (1) erasure of the ambiguity of the term “substantial part,” and (2) 
clearly defining  what exactly constitutes participation or intervention in a 
political campaign.269 This Article both recommends and departs from 
Professor James’s twofold solution to ensure stringent enforcement of the 
Johnson Amendment.270 
 First, amending the Code to clarify the definition of what constitutes 
a “substantial part” would not only provide notice to religious organizations 
curious about the extent of their influence in legislation, but would also 
provide the IRS with a bright line of the activity to specifically target. 
Professor James writes that the language “substantial part” should be 
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narrowly limited to “direct or indirect contact with an elected official in 
attempt to influence legislation.”271 Although the proposal invites a myriad 
of speculative inquiries as to what constitutes an “indirect contact” with an 
elected official, what is certain is that the proposal captures those situations 
in which direct contact is made by the religious organization, on behalf of the 
religious organization, with the elected official, to influence legislation. 
While the IRS has historically struggled with effectively prosecuting those 
religious organizations that violate the Johnson Amendment’s prohibition, 
this retooling of the definition would empower the IRS to more consistently 
and equitably proceed with enforcement. As an added plus, the proposed 
change provides ample notice to religious organizations about whether their 
activities amount to lobbying. Professor James’s proposal does not prevent 
members of religious organizations from contacting legislators, driven by 
their religious convictions; rather, it prevents the tax-exempt religious 
organization from doing such.  
 Second, Professor James calls for a clear definition as to what exactly 
constitutes participation or intervention in a political campaign, which is 
critical to the success of strict enforcement. While there is validity in this 
request, to provide additional guidance to the IRS (and notice to religious 
organizations), additional regulations and revenue rulings will not likely aid 
the IRS in enforcing the Johnson Amendment. Rather, the following actions 
must occur. First, the President’s executive order, titled “Promoting Free 
Speech and Religious Liberty,” must be overturned, either though revocation 
by the current sitting (or later-elected) President, or legislation geared to 
invalidate the executive order. Second, following the revocation, the IRS 
must begin to explore and investigate the taxation status of a church under 
the (hopefully) revitalized CAPA. It is through this mechanism the IRS could 
execute an examination of the organization’s non-religious records and 
activities to determine whether the organization has engaged in improper 
political activity.  
 In sum, to further prevent exploitation of the taxation scheme under 
26 U.S.C.§ 501(c)(3), Congress must provide a brighter line with what 
amounts to a “substantial part” of a tax-exempt organization’s activities in 
connection to lobbying. Moreover, the IRS must commence proper 
enforcement of the Johnson Amendment and investigate those religious 
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organizations either in violation of the Code’s prohibitions, or close to being 
in violation, to issue advisory warnings or punish with excise taxes.  
CONCLUSION 
As related in this Article, there are a number of Code provisions 
which demand greater scrutiny through Establishment Clause analysis. Time 
and time again, however, because of constraints by policy and First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the IRS and the courts have exercised restraint in 
entertaining discussion as to the constitutional validity of these provisions, 
and with that, the legitimacy of some religious organizations’ tax-exempt 
status.  
Further complicating the affairs of IRS policy and First Amendment 
jurisprudence is the interplay between the executive and legislative branches. 
Presently, it remains contestable whether the administration ultimately 
wishes the overall tax burden on religious organizations to decrease. But, 
with seemingly incongruent policies authorized by the Trump administration, 
it remains a prominent question of whether the executive orders and 
administration-backed legislation support, in totality, the legitimacy of the 
statutory scheme on religious tax-exemption.  
But while the government continues to avoid these pressing issues, 
many religious entities and leaders are empowered to exploit the malleable 
statutory framework for their financial benefit. Of course, the Constitution 
protects churchgoers, pastors, and believers who wish to personally provide 
tangible and intangible benefit to the unique American fabric; but surely the 
Constitution and Code do not provide insulation for those institutional 
“wolves” who come in “sheep’s clothing.” 
